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Abstract 
    The cybersecurity community typically reacts to 
attacks after they occur.  Being reactive is costly and 
can be fatal where attacks threaten lives, important 
data, or mission success.  But can cybersecurity be done 
proactively? Our research capitalizes on the 
Germination Period—the time lag between hacker 
communities discussing software flaw types and flaws 
actually being exploited—where proactive measures 
can be taken. We argue for a novel proactive approach, 
utilizing big data, for (I) identifying potential attacks 
before they come to fruition; and based on this 
identification, (II) developing preventive counter-
measures. The big data approach resulted in our vision 
of the Proactive Cybersecurity System (PCS), a layered, 
modular service platform that applies big data 
collection and processing tools to a wide variety of 
unstructured data sources to predict vulnerabilities and 
develop countermeasures.  Our exploratory study is the 
first to show the promise of this novel proactive 
approach and illuminates challenges that need to be 
addressed.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
    The number and variety of cyber-attacks is rapidly 
increasing, and the rate of new software vulnerabilities 
is also rising dramatically.  According to a recent study 
“the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of detected 
security incidents has increased 66% year-over-year 
since 2009” [21]. But the software security community 
is typically reacting to attacks after they occur. Being 
reactive is costly and can be fatal, where attacks threaten 
lives, important data, or mission success.      
Unfortunately, existing research on cybersecurity has 
focused almost exclusively on reactive strategies.  Some 
attempts to be “proactive”, such as in the guidelines 
published by IEEE Center for Secure Design [14], have 
been outlined, but these are limited to the scope of 
software design and are rather abstract.  
     Predictive analytics, an emerging tool being used to 
identify potential cyber threats against organizations, 
has the capability to be proactive but currently it is not.  
The emerging predictive analytics used in the security 
industry attempts to build a specific response to a 
specific cybersecurity threat [26].  As attackers find new 
ways to avoid detection, predictive analytics helps 
security professionals find unknown malware wherever 
it may be hiding. Bit predictive analytics, as it is 
currently practiced, doesn’t mean seeing an attack 
before it occurs [26], which is what we mean by being 
“proactive”.  For instance, the analytics software 
company FICO, although still not “proactive” by our 
definition, used predictive real-time analytics to respond 
to data breaches faster than before [12].  The traditional 
approach of gathering data on a compromise, 
developing a threat’s “signature” and then using that 
signature to protect against future threats, results in 
massive time delays. FICO, in contrast, identifies threats 
as they come on the scene by identifying anomalous 
patterns using real-time analytics.   This identification 
has to build on the profiling of attacks that are currently 
known. But by this time considerable damage has 
already been done.    
Can we be truly proactive about cybersecurity, in the 
sense that we can prevent the attack before it occurs? 
Can we predict what concepts that are emerging in the 
hacker community will eventually evolve into a 
successful exploit or an attack?  These are our research 
questions. Our research is on analogy with the medical 
industry’s use of predictive analytics to proactively 
prevent disease outbreaks.  To be proactive, the disease 
has to be recognized before, not after, it becomes 
widespread.   
 In addition, continuing the medical analogy, to be 
proactive, we not only look out for external attacks, e.g., 
disease outbreaks, but we also need to look internally, 
in terms of an individual’s predisposition to a disease. It 
has been shown [20] that a majority of security bugs—
nearly two thirds—are “foundational”; that is, they have 
existed for many years in a system’s legacy code. Many 
of them are, in fact, 0-day vulnerabilities, which give no 
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time to plan any mitigation against their exploitation 
once the flaws become known.  To be proactive, 
organizations must take security assurance steps after a 
software product has been released, but before the broad 
hacker community discovers its vulnerabilities [7]. 
The proactive approach, if proven feasible, would be 
a game-changer for the cybersecurity community. Our 
research is motivated by the enormous potential benefits 
of this approach. The proactive approach is appealing, 
but questions remain whether it is feasible. Our 
exploratory study is the first to show the promise of this 
novel proactive approach, utilizing big data, and 
illuminates challenges that need to be addressed.    
       In what follows, we discuss the “Germination 
Period”, a time lag between hacker communities 
discussing software flaw types and those flaws being 
exploited. Our definition of Germination Period 
includes the previously identified “Honeymoon period”, 
which occurs after the release of a system, but before the 
identification of its first vulnerability [7]. Both of these 
periods represent opportunities where proactive 
counter-measures can be advantageously taken.    
   The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In 
Section 3, we present our vision of a Proactive 
Cybersecurity System (PCS), based on the big data 
approach. In Section 4, we describe our research 
framework and discuss challenges and directions for 
realizing PCS. Section 5 presents our exploratory study.  
Section 6 concludes with remarks for future work.  
  
2. The Germination Period and Big Data 
 
We first conducted a literature review on the patterns 
of past cyber-attacks to help answer our research 
questions. We found that the ‘black hat’ (offensive 
hacker) community is a learning community with unique 
ecologic properties, and we found there’s a time lag that 
we called the Germination Period. This is the time 
between the emergence of a vulnerability concept in the 
hacker community and the creation of successful 
attacks.  It is during this Germination Period that we can 
be proactive.  For example, in May 2005, Robert 
Seacord, a security specialist at the Software 
Engineering Institute, published the first edition of 
Secure Coding in C and C++. On page 156 of his book, 
he cautioned about "referencing freed memory" [23]. In 
2007, researchers from WatchFire reported a "Dangling 
Pointer" vulnerability in Microsoft IIS [1] and Justin 
Ferguson gave a talk at the Blackhat conference 
reporting one of the first valid exploits of what became 
known as Use-After-Free (UAF) [9].  Blogs and 
tutorials related to the concepts of UAF began to appear 
frequently around 2010.   Figure 1 below shows the 
reported number of common vulnerabilities and 
exposures (CVEs), by year, for UAF entries. Successful 
UAF attacks can have serious consequences: corruption 
of data, and the execution of arbitrary code. 
Clearly the offensive hacker community learned 
(about UAFs) and just as clearly it takes time, from the 
initial discovery of a vulnerability until it becomes a 
significant and viable threat to the “white hat” 
community. This time lag between 2006 to 2010, the 
Germination Period, during which offensive 
communities are gaining understanding and expertise 
and planning exploits, represents an opportunity for 
proactive counter-measures. But such counter-measures 
can only be applied if the potential threat is determined 
early enough.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Use-After-Free Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures (CVEs) 
 
How does the offensive community gain 
understanding and expertise in planning exploits?  What 
traces do they leave? In our exploratory study, we have 
identified two main categories of data sources 
containing information leading to emerging concepts 
describing vulnerabilities that are likely to be targeted: 
(1) hacker communities, and (2) public security 
databases. Both types of data sources discuss 
vulnerabilities, PoC (Proof of Concept) exploits, and 
attacks.  Interestingly, we have noted that both source 
types recognize occurrences of PoC exploits, attacks, 
and vulnerabilities at the same time. It has been shown 
that there are time delays, e.g., the Germination Period, 
both between the identification of vulnerabilities and the 
production of PoC exploits and also between hostile 
attacks targeting these vulnerabilities and the 
corresponding PoC exploits [6][23]. We intend to 
broaden these data sources, thus taking a big data 
approach, to show something more general, by 
identifying as many contexts as possible and 
determining whether the time delays are different in 
different contexts. 
 Hackers form communities. Some of the hackers’ 
blogs, software repositories, IRC channels, etc. can be 
found on the internet.  They are learning communities 
and they are innovation communities, no different from 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, researchers and even 
terrorist organizations. This is why they are successful 
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and why we fear them. But, mounting a successful 
attack requires tremendous resources and patience. 
Hacker communities, as with all innovation 
communities, need to share information to be effective; 
they build on each other’s work and discourse, 
sometimes directly but more often indirectly [26]. By 
analyzing the topics in hackers' discussions, we will be 
are likely to be the focus of upcoming attacks. Early 
insight can lead to early, and hence more effective, 
quality assurance and mitigation strategies.able to get 
early indication as to which vulnerabilities  
As a result, we believe and will present early evidence 
that we can mine hacker discussion forums, blogs, and 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels (e.g. freenode.net, 
AnonOps IRC, Metasploit IRC, Google Project Zero, 
blackhat.com, GMANE.org, seclists.org) to identify 
emerging concepts.  In this way the software security 
community can be more proactive in detecting and 
eliminating vulnerabilities, rather than simply reacting 
to vulnerabilities as they occur. For example, the 
Heartbleed bug was discovered simultaneously by 
(defensive) security researchers at Google and at 
Codenomicon, avoiding potentially huge losses if 
hackers had found this bug first (in April, 2014 more 
than 2/3 of the world’s web servers were vulnerable to 
Heartbleed). 
  In addition, our exploratory study has already mined 
publicly available vulnerability, exploit, and attack 
databases such as CVEs (cve.mitre.org), CVE Details 
(cvedetails.com), and the Open Web Application 
Security Project's (OWASP) WASC Web Hacking 
Incidents Database (WHID) 
(https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WASC_
Web_Hacking_Incidents_Database_Project) to create 
an initial ontology of prominent security concepts.   
     There are also important differences between these 
two types of data sources. By collecting data from 
various sources, we can assemble information about 
different aspects of the same vulnerabilities and 
exploits. This means that such differences can be 
combined and compared for better understanding of the 
conditions responsible for the time delays between 
vulnerabilities and exploits—a distinct advantage of 
utilizing big data. 
 
3. Proactive Cybersecurity System (PCS) 
Vision 
 
   Our big data approach results in a vision of the 
Proactive Cybersecurity System (PCS) as shown in 
Figure 1.   Grounded on a wide variety of unstructured 
big data sources, the PCS has two goals:  
      Goal I: identify potential attacks before they take 
place and cause harm, and based on this identification, 
     Goal II: develop preventive counter-measures.  
  
 
Figure 2.   Proactive Security System
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     To achieve Goal I, a Targeted Vulnerability 
Prediction (TVP) subsystem detects, from hackers' ad 
hoc communities and publicly available security 
sources, the emerging concepts that are the early 
warning signs of likely vulnerability targets.     To 
achieve Goal II, (a) an Architectural Vulnerability 
Detection (AVD) subsystem and (b) a Risk Analysis and 
Recommender (RAR) subsystem were designed. AVD 
adds a further capability of predicting the impact of the 
attack vectors identified in the TVP subsystem on a 
system architecture of a company. RAR analyzes the 
risks associated with identified vulnerabilities, estimate 
the costs of mitigation actions, and recommend 
refactoring and assurance strategies. The TVP, AVD, 
and RAR subsystems constitute the PCS, a modular 
service platform that combines data sources, data 
collection and processing tools, metrics and models for 
use of security personnel, researchers, governments, and 
insurance companies.   
     
4.  Research Framework and Challenges 
 
    Figure 3 shows our research framework for 
developing a PCS.  We will discuss the research steps, 
analytical foundations, tools employed as well as the 
preliminary results for achieving Goal I and Goal II. 
    As shown in Figure 3, for TVP our research steps 
include (1) identifying big data sources; (2) collecting 
and managing big data; (3) identifying emerging 
concepts; (4) tracking concept evolution; and (5) 
prioritizing vulnerabilities.  In parallel, we develop 
internal proactive measures for an organization by the 
AVD and RAR subsystems. Next we describe our 
preliminary directions and illuminate the challenges to 
be addressed in each step.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.  PCS Research Framework
  
4.1 Identify Big Data Sources 
 
Inherent in the big data approach, identifying and 
assessing the data sources is a critical activity as the 
subsequent analysis and proactive measures rely on the 
quality, comprehensiveness, and reliability of the data. 
There are many potential data sources available and 
different data sources have different characteristics and 
provide different information. For instance, one 
important difference is that most of the public security 
databases do not provide information about who 
contributed an entry to the database. Hacker sources do 
typically identify who is making a contribution. In many 
cases, however, the names provided are fanciful and an 
individual may not use the same designation in different 
chats, lists and database contributions.  
     Furthermore, publicly accessible online databases 
are maintained by various organizations. MITRE’s CVE 
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database collects vulnerability, exploit and attack 
information. An offshoot of this is CVE Details. This 
website identifies vulnerability and corresponding 
exploit types for which advanced searching can be done. 
This data can be tabulated showing frequencies of 
instances of vulnerability or exploit types on a yearly 
basis. This tabularized data can also show the frequency 
of exploits across all types also on a yearly basis. We 
have already explored some of this data, and patterns 
have emerged.  In most cases, there are spikes in certain 
years in the number of recognized vulnerabilities. In 
some cases, the changes from one year to another can be 
as great as 1000 occurrences. 
    Similar variations and spikes in frequency are seen in 
data on exploits, both PoC and hostile. This information 
can be mined from CVEs, CVE Details, the exploit 
databases, and the WHID. As with the vulnerability 
frequency data, the frequency of occurrence of PoC 
exploits and attacks changes over time. Determining the 
root causes for such patterns, particularly the spikes, is 
one of our research goals. We may find that some 
attacks come prior to PoC exploits and close in time to 
the discovery of a vulnerability, perhaps even before its 
discovery. In such cases initial attacks would not be 
preventable. Even if we don’t find the requisite events 
or conditions that occur enough before all attacks, the 
events and conditions we do find will enable us to make 
predictions about a spike in attacks that we can mitigate. 
In addition to keeping track of instances of 
vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks, we also have to 
keep track of what category in the ontology they are 
instances of. We may find, for example, that while 
instances are increasing in a high-level category, they 
are only increasing in certain sub-categories, and not 
others. It is these specific increasing subcategories that 
provide a basis for mitigation strategies. 
   There are several challenges here. Exploit databases 
typically have much more extensive coverage of 
exploits than the CVE Details website. Also, the 
WHID’s collection of attack instances is much smaller 
than the true number since organizations are often 
reluctant to acknowledge that they have been attacked. 
Because of these and other discrepancies among the data 
sources, our analyses will not treat any source as 
definitive. We will instead triangulate over several data 
sources, and in the TVP module we will generate a 
confidence score for the predictions, depending on the 
extent to which trends discovered in multiple data 
sources are compatible. 
 
4.2 Collecting and Managing Data 
 
   Collecting and managing this big, unstructured data 
presents significant challenges.  Quantifying instances 
of vulnerabilities and exploits is currently done through 
numerous manual searches, laboriously selecting and 
counting entries. One of our goals is to automate this 
process as much as possible, although we realize that a 
human will always be “in the loop”, as indicated in 
Figure 2.  We will utilize existing web spider technology 
to collect data from hacker forums. Also, we have 
gained substantial experience in network evolution 
visualization and successfully developed web-scraping 
and crowdsourcing tools, which will be core modules 
for data collection and management. Large volumes and 
different varieties of data will have to be collected from 
the main data sources, ingested, stored and prepared for 
analysis.  A big data repository is thus planned for 
storing the raw data to allow “schema on read” [5][6] 
for different types of analysis.  There are tremendous 
technical challenges in terms of preparing data for 
analysis.  The data cleaning and integration is not a 
trivial task  [6].   
 
4.3 Identifying Emerging Concepts 
 
   Accurately identifying emerging concepts is critical to 
the success of PCS. To address the inherent complexity 
of the data collected, we are employing text mining, 
concept clustering and sentiment analysis techniques to 
identify: 1) emerging concepts against the background 
of more prominent and lasting ones; and 2) emerging 
hacker communities associated with the emerging 
concepts. Because of the huge amount of data involved, 
manual curation will not be possible in general, and so 
PCS needs to aid and guide a human analyst who will 
make the final interpretation and decision to develop 
countermeasures. 
    For 1), we are primarily applying text mining 
(extracting and clustering noun phrases [3]), concept 
clustering and mapping, and ontological analysis to 
identify and track concepts. The text mining results will 
provide continuous input for the concept clustering, 
mapping and sentiment analysis phase and together they 
will provide results for inclusion into an evolving 
ontology. Ontology building is done manually at the 
moment, but we are investigating ways to automate as 
much of this as possible. 
     For 2), the tasks are: a) elaborate the structure and 
evolution of hacker communities by analyzing their 
network structures; and b) determine which of the 
emerging concepts are not only likely vulnerabilities but 
which are likely targets of attacks and hence worthy of 
attention by a human analyst.  
     For concept clustering, mapping and sentiment 
analysis, we are employing the Leximancer tool 
(leximancer.com). Leximancer analyzes the frequencies 
and co-occurrence relationships between words in a text 
corpus and produces concept maps that show and name 
the significant concepts in the corpus. Leximancer also 
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shows the relationships among the most significant 
concepts used in a text corpus, including those that 
express sentiment [16][24]. It enables rapid analysis of 
tens of thousands or more text entries in records like 
those collected in Gmane or CVE List, but also allows 
modulation of the results through researcher 
intervention and interpretation. As an example, a portion 
of the concept map from a completed automated 
analysis of the entire CVE List circa August 2015 is 
shown in Figure 4.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: CVE Concept Map 
 
 
4.4 Tracking Concept Evolution 
 
    We iteratively perform three interrelated processes to 
mine concepts and track their changes. The concepts to 
be mined and tracked cover conditions leading to the 
identification of vulnerabilities and exploits (both non-
hostile and hostile) along with a characterization of the 
vulnerabilities and exploits themselves and their 
classification. The characterization differentiates, and 
the classification relates, the individuals, groups, 
communities and organizations, the systems and 
applications, and the processes, methods and techniques 
involved. The three processes are:  
1) mining security data sources using noun-
phrase parsing, automated terminology 
construction, statistical analysis and clustering 
to determine the most salient concepts [16] in 
the corpora being analyzed and track their 
changes through time;  
2) mapping the relationships among these 
concepts and also tracking their changes 
through time, employing Leximancer. This 
will generate a series of maps representing the 
changing networks of the most prominent, 
relevant, and important concepts mined, 
including concepts representing both positive 
and negative sentiments;  
3) building a security ontology [17][19][9], that 
we call the Emergent Vulnerabilities and 
Exploits Ontology (EVEO), based on the 
results of 1) and 2) that will help guide the 
construction and tracking of emerging 
concepts.  
    One challenge is to compare a series of maps, and to 
view the changing state of the ontology over time. 
However, we have already identified a promising 
candidate technology, TopicFlow, to aid us in 
visualizing topics and topic evolution [25]. 
 
4.5         Prioritizing Vulnerabilities 
 
Not all vulnerabilities are of the same value.  We have 
identified two approaches to help prioritize identified 
vulnerabilities. One is using machine learning to 
determine the characteristics of a “high priority” 
vulnerability. We will perform retrospective case 
studies as training sets for the machine learning. The 
other is to apply ecology theory [13] to help identify 
emerging concepts, refine the categorization, and 
prioritize the vulnerabilities. Two processes coexist in 
5983
each concept's community: symbiosis and competition. 
As more and more participants join a community, their 
symbiosis allows them to coexist in the community, 
through collaboration and cooperation. At the same 
time, as more and more participants are in the 
community, they may face increasing competition with 
each other. Accordingly, the density of a community is 
used as an indicator for both symbiosis and competition 
among individual participants. 
We will identify, as far as possible, the participants in 
the hacker discussion forums, blogs, and IRC channels 
who contributed to or commented on the topics and 
concepts detected. The participants for each concept 
will be considered as a community for that concept. If 
two participants contributed content to the same concept 
in one of the venues or they commented on each other's 
contributions, then there is a relation between them. 
Based on these participants and relationships, we are 
able to build a network for each concept for any period 
of time. To assess the impact of ecology on the evolution 
of concepts, at the community level, we will apply the 
density-dependence model [13] to explain the vital rates 
of concept communities (e.g., entry, growth, and exit 
rates). Using a technique of text mining—sentiment 
analysis—we will also be able to associate rates of entry 
with different sentiments, thus enhancing our 
understanding of concept trajectory and momentum. 
 
4.6 Developing Countermeasures 
 
   The AVD and RAR subsystems will enable internal 
proactive measures for an organization, taking 
advantage of the Germination Period. For a specific 
organization producing software the Germination 
Period will be a short window of opportunity after their 
software product has been released, but before the 
hacker community discovers its vulnerabilities.   
Currently, there exist few proactive methods. As 
aforementioned, it has been shown [20] that a majority 
of security bugs—nearly two thirds—are 
“foundational.” Taken together with the Germination 
Period, these observations suggest that one cannot 
simply try to find all of the security bugs in a system, 
but rather must take a strategic, risk-driven approach to 
security assurance.  For this reason, we are constructing 
a cybersecurity countermeasures approach, extending 
the existing tools and methods:  
    1) Driven by input (e.g. candidate emerging 
vulnerabilities) from the TVP subsystem, we will 
analyze the architecture of individual systems, using the 
Architecture Analysis for Security (AAFS) method [22] 
to understand the risks posed by these vulnerabilities; 
The AAFS method grew out of existing architecture 
analysis techniques, such as the architecture tradeoff 
analysis method (ATAM) [8], but focuses solely on 
security. The rationale behind architectural analysis is 
that discovering design problems during coding or 
maintenance is too late, because addressing these 
problems later in the life cycle is costly, risky, and 
disruptive to a project. At the point in a project’s 
lifecycle when a software architecture has been 
established, but before much code has been written, the 
architecture can be analyzed for risks [2].  
   2) A toolcalled Titan [28] will be used to identify 
architectural structures that are potentially implicated in 
the targeted vulnerabilities, to locate the design flaws 
within these structures, and to identify the specific files 
within these structures that have the highest probability 
of experiencing a security bug. The Titan tool chain 
takes, as input, a project’s source code, its revision 
history (from a configuration management tool such as 
SVN), and its issues (from an issue-tracking system 
such as Jira) and, based on this input, clusters the 
architecture into a set of overlapping DRSpaces. These 
DRSpaces are then analyzed for architectural flaws—
anti-patterns that we call hotspots.  These hotspots have 
been shown to be highly correlated with bugs, changes, 
and churn [17]. And we have discovered that these 
results hold for security as well [10]. That is, when a file 
is implicated in architectural flaws, it is significantly 
more likely to be involved in a security bug.  The more 
flaws a file is implicated in, the greater the probability 
that the file will experience security problems. 
    3) Using the knowledge from 1) and 2), the RAR 
subsystem will propose refactoring solutions to the 
architectures, based on removing the design flaws 
[15][17].  AAFS and Titan techniques serve to identify 
the risks in the system. To actually remove these risks, 
the system under scrutiny needs to be fixed and often 
this requires refactoring, to remove the identified 
hotspots. While it is true that many bugs are caused by 
pure coding errors, our Titan-based results suggest that 
architectural flaws play a large role in increasing the 
frequency of security bugs. Thus, no simple coding 
solution will fix this problem.  The only way to fix it is 
to refactor the architecture, to remove the flaws.  
Fortunately, we have the necessary information to do 
just that.  The Titan tool identifies not only flawed parts 
of the architecture, but also the reasons for the flaws and 
the precise set of files implicated.   
 
4.  Exploratory Study  
     We have conducted a retrospective exploratory study 
to gauge the feasibility of the proactive cybersecurity 
approach and the TVP design.  We analyzed both the 
Gmane “Full-Disclosure” email list 
(http://dir.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.fulldisclosu
re) and the CVE database for comparison. We wanted to 
see the differences between the contents of the hacker 
mailing list and the CVE database for purposes of 
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characterizing already recognized vulnerabilities and 
identifying and characterizing emerging ones. The 
Gmane list, which covers 2010 to 2015, is well over 250 
MB. It contains a lot of noise including binary code, 
source code and boilerplate information (such as 
advertisements for security products and services) that 
can be repeated thousands of times, but contribute little, 
if any, useful information. Cleansing such files is part of 
our text mining process.  
    Our initial approach was to extract and mine the 
contents of the Subject and Date fields. There were over 
22,000 Subject and Date fields. We found similarities 
and differences in the coverage of DLL hijacking when 
we analyzed the two data sources. Additional 
information about product targets found in hacker 
discussions was not found in CVE database contents. 
The additional information that hacker discussions 
provide increases the potential for preventing or 
reducing attacks on these targets crucial for an early 
warning model relevant to attacks on these targets.  
Conversely, the relationships among DLL Hijacking on 
the one hand and Trojan Horse, local users, gaining 
privileges, untrusted search path vulnerabilities, and 
executing arbitrary code on the other are, in fact, the 
primary considerations in the CVE entries.  Knowing 
these relationships is an important part of understanding 
how DLL Hijacking attacks are performed and what 
kinds of targets they are likely to aim for. 
    In short, the two data sources (Gmane and CVE) 
supplement one another.  Both sources are needed for an 
early warning model that prevents attacks or mitigates 
their numbers. The retrospective case study re-enforces 
the importance of 1) identifying and integrating  
information from various data  sources and 2) 
determining  what information can be indicative of 
emerging vulnerabilities, new forms of exploit, or the 
(types of) targets of future attacks.  
   For example, in analyzing the text of “Full 
Disclosure” for 2009 we can see that DLL is an 
important concept, but “hijack” that has not emerged as 
a concept. There are other, however, potentially relevant 
concepts that are clustered close to DLL, such as 
“bypass” and “exploitation”, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Concept Clusters from 2009 “Full 
Disclosure” 
  
   Using our ontology, however, we can attempt to 
“seed” the concept clustering process. An analysis of the 
same “Full Disclosure” list for 2009, but with seeding, 
shows DLL and “hijack” in a single cluster, as shown in 
Figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: 2009 “Full Disclosure” with Seeding 
 
Finally, in 2010, we can see that DLL and hijacking 
appear clustered together, as shown in Figure 7, and 
distinct from other attack types such as SQL injection. 
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Figure 7: Concept Clusters from 2010 “Full 
Disclosure” 
    
 This case study demonstrates the two major 
components of the TVP module of PCS: text mining and 
concept clustering. Together they aid an analyst in 
identifying potential categories (types), subcategories, 
their characteristics and relations, all elements of an 
ontology. Building a useful PCS ontology requires 
keeping track not only of all the concepts that have been 
discovered, as well as their associated characteristics 
and relationships at every level of the concept hierarchy, 
but also a way of keeping track of when people became 
aware of the concepts and when their corresponding 
instances occur. Having a way of keeping track of these 
correspondences is crucial, and this is precisely what the 
PCS ontology is designed to do.  There are other reasons 
why building an ontology is critical. The hierarchical 
and relational structure of the categories provide 
blueprints of how new categories are derived from 
existing categories. This could be the basis for detecting 
emerging concepts.  
   For example, using text mining results from the Full-
Disclosure list, we found that there are occurrences of 
terms standing for concepts like SQL-injection, XSS-
injection and SQL and XSS-injection. Since we also 
found HTML-injection, might we find HTML and XSS-
injection? In fact, we did find this.  However, if we did 
not, this would put us on the lookout for it—a proactive 
measure. Also, for sibling categories like remote code 
execution and local code execution, if a code execution 
exploit or a code execution attack has been identified, 
we would look for a remote-code execution exploit or a 
local-code execution exploit and a remote-code 
execution attack or a local-code execution attack. 
Assuming that an exploit of a vulnerability is to make it 
part of a viable method for attacking a system, if we find 
an exploit but not a corresponding attack, this might be 
an early warning sign that the corresponding attack is 
imminent. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work  
 
In this paper, we have explored the idea of a 
proactive approach to cybersecurity and shown 
promising progress towards this goal. We have 
identified an opportunity in the Germination Period, 
which is the time-period during which proactive 
measures may be most advantageously taken, and we 
have shown that a proactive approach to cybersecurity, 
utilizing big data, holds enormous potential. We also 
contributed the design of the Proactive Cybersecurity 
System, which serves as a research framework, and 
illuminates a number of research and practical 
challenges that need to be addressed. Big data is the 
predictive analytics foundation for the PCS.  The PCS 
rests on a big data infrastructure for extracting 
information from hackers’ communities and security 
data sources, transforming (cleansing) and loading the 
data, clustering and visualizing it, and curating it for 
future use. Our first exploratory retrospective study 
showed significant potential as a training set for 
machine learning. We are currently developing more 
retrospective studies and heuristics for machine learning 
and hope to develop the full PCS as envisioned.   
  A proactive approach to cybersecurity will be a 
game-changer.  If successful, we expect our eventual 
research results will guide quality assurance and risk 
mitigation activities, allowing the security assurance 
community to be proactive rather than reactive.  
Although security assurance personnel must have been 
doing some of this already, they currently do so in an ad 
hoc fashion, based on their personal experience. Thus 
they are operating without proper decision support and 
with limited, typically organization-internal data. These 
existing efforts will be significantly enhanced by the 
PCS.    
We must stress that the challenges that we have 
already encountered are not trivial. The data to be 
collected is vast and poorly structured, and the analysis 
is complex. We are truly looking for needles among 
haystacks.  But in view of the enormous benefits that 
may be achieved by the proactive approach, we are 
compelled to share our preliminary results, hoping to 
engage broader participation and collaboration for 
building a proactive cybersecurity community and 
realizing the PCS vision.      
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